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Article 8

Compensating for Race or National Origin in
Employment Testing
MICHAEL A. REITER*
INTRODUCTION

In 1971 the United States Supreme Court rendered its now famous decision interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,'
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.2 Although that decision stands for more
than one proposition,3 it is most often quoted for the following rule
of law:
The Act [Title VIII proscribes not only overt discrimination but
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation
...
. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.4
As a result of Griggs, courts have interpreted Title VII to permit a
challenge to any employment practice which, although neutral on
its face, has a disparate impact 5 upon protected persons affected by
* Partner in the firm of Katten, Muchin, Gitles, Zavis, Pearl & Galler in Chicago, Illinois.
B.S., University of Wisconsin, 1963; M.S., 1964; Ph.D., 1969; J.D., University of Wisconsin
Law School, 1967. Assistant Regional Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Chicago Litigation Center, 1973-1974. Member of the Illinois and Wisconsin Bars.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (Supp. IV
1974). Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970 & Supp.
IV 1974), states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or to otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
2. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
3. The Court held that the thrust of Title VII goes to the consequences of employment
practices, and not merely the motivation; that the guidelines of the EEOC are entitled to
great deference; and that under Title VII, practices, tests, or procedures neutral on their face
or in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior
discriminatory practices. Id. at 430-34.
4. Id. at 431.
5. The term "disparate impact" as used in this article, and as reflected in the cases cited
herein, means having a disproportionate effect, and should not be confused with the definition of "disparate treatment" found in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.11 (1975). That section states:
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the particular employment practice.8
When challenging an employment practice on these grounds,7 a
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that the
questioned employment practice has a disparate impact upon the
particular minority group to which the plaintiff belongs.' Once the
plaintiff demonstrates the disparate impact, the burden shifts to the
defendant to justify the use of the questioned employment practice;
for instance, by proving that its use is a business necessity
The principle of disparate or unequal treatment must be distinguished from the
concepts of test validation. A test or other employee selection standard-even
though validated against job performance in accordance with the guidelines in this
part-cannot be imposed upon any individual or class protected by title VII where
other employees, applicants or members have not been subjected to that standard.
Disparate treatment, for example, occurs where members of a minority or sex group
have been denied the same employment, promotion, transfer or membership opportunities as have been made available to other employees or applicants. Those employees or applicants who have been denied equal treatment because of prior discriminatory practices or policies, must at least be afforded the same opportunities
as had existed for other employees or applicants during the period of discrimination. Thus, no new test or other employee selection standard can be imposed upon
a class of individuals protected by title VII who, but for prior discrimination, would
have been granted the opportunity to qualify under less stringent selection standards previously in force.
6. See, e.g., Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974); Gregory v. Litton
Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d
Cir. 1972).
7. There are basically three other ways of proving employment discrimination: (1) by
showing direct, deliberate, willful discrimination by the defendant, e.g., by showing that he
has used racial epithets. See, e.g., Murry v. Am. Standard, Inc. 373 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La.),
aff'd, 488 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1973); (2) by inferring discrimination through a showing that
the defendant has a disproportionately low number of minority employees given the size of
the locale from which the defendant draws its work force. See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); (3) by showing "(i) that [a person] belongs to a
racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant's qualifications." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973).
8. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Rogers v. Int'l Paper Co.,
510 F.2d 1340, 1348 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ga. Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 912 (5th
Cir. 1973); Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176 (2d Cir. 1972), with Brown v.
Gaston County Dyeing & Mach. Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975).
9. See, e.g., Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Palmer v. Gen.
Mills, Inc., 513 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1975); Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir.
1974); United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973). In Palmer, the court stated that the test is whether an overriding
legitimate business purpose exists, making the practice necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of the business:
The specific elements of the standard are as follows: the business purpose must be
sufficiently compelling to override any discriminatory impact; the practice must
effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be
available no alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the
business purpose or accomplish it equally well but with a lesser discriminatory
impact.
513 F.2d at 1044.
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Moreover, courts have made it abundantly clear that this approach is not limited to cases involving racial discrimination, 0 nor
does it apply only to those cases where a particular employment
practice perpetuates past discrimination by the defendant." Based
upon the above principles, courts have held an employer's use of
garnishments," arrest records, '3 conviction records," educational
attainment, 5 length of time on a particular job," "walk-in" or
"word of mouth recruitment,"' 7 height requirements, 8 hair style, 9
hair length,20 and employment tests2' to be neutral employment
criteria which, upon a showing of disproportionate impact upon a
protected class, are proscribed by Title VII. As a result, their use
has been enjoined.2 2
10. E.g., Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975); Wells v. Frontier
Airlines, 381 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Tex. 1974). But see General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct.
401 (1976).
11. Although Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), dealt with a neutral criterion
which perpetuated past discrimination, courts since Griggs have held that, absent a statutory
defense, Title VII proscribes the use of all neutral employment criteria which have a disparate
impact upon a group protected by Title VII, whether or not the criteria perpetuate past
discrimination of that employer. See, e.g., Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir.
1974); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
12. See, e.g., Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Pike Corp.
of Am., 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971); cf. Robinson v. City of Dallas, 514 F.2d 1271 (5th
Cir. 1975), holding that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for racial discrimination, where he challenged a city personnel rule authorizing the disciplining of employees who
fail to pay their "just debts."
13. See, e.g., Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
14. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); c. Richardson v. Hotel
Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), affd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
15. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Padilla v. Stringer, 395 F.
Supp. 495 (D.N.M. 1974).
16. See, e.g., Russell v. Am. Tobacco Co., 374 F. Supp. 286 (M.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 528 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Ga. Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 925-26 (5th Cir. 1973); Rock
v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 473 F.2d 1344, 1347 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. United Transp.
Union Lodge 550 v. Rock, 412 U.S. 933 (1973).
18. See, e.g., Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5575 (E.D. Mo. 1976)
(but holding business necessity established).
19. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 522 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1975);
Smith v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 486 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1973).
20. See, e.g., Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Roberts
v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1971). Contra, Willingham v. Macon Tel.
Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975); Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
402 (D.D.C. 1972); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
21. See, e.g., Firefighters Inst. For Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th
Cir. 1977); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482
F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Kirkland
v. N.Y. State Dept. of Correction Serv., 374 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
22. See, e.g., Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); Wallace v. Debron
Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974). Of course, one may question whether the law should
prohibit an employer from utilizing an employment criterion that perpetuates previous dis-
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The purpose of this article is to examine testing as a neutral
employment criterion. In so doing, it will focus on the various methods used to establish that an employment test is job related. These
methods are generally referred to as test validation. Because validating a test-that is, showing that the test is an adequate predictor
of performance on a particular job-is both expensive and timeconsuming, suggestions have been made that artificial "handicaps"
be given to minority employees and applicants for employment in
order to avoid the need to engage in employment test validation.
These suggestions are appealing to employers who wish to continue
the use of employment tests, since it is considerably less expensive
to grant preferences to persons of minority group background than
it is to validate a particular employment test. However, problems
of "reverse discrimination" may arise as white victims of the preference challenge its use. This article will examine alternative methods
to employment testing validation to determine whether any of such
methods will withstand the "reverse discrimination" challenge.
EMPLOYMENT TESTING AS A NEUTRAL CRITERION

General Principlesof the Law of Employment Testing
The most frequently encountered barrier to equal employment
opportunity is the use of written tests.13 Accordingly, written tests"
crimination by society in general but does not in any way perpetuate past discrimination of
the employer. Compelling arguments can be made that an employer who has discriminated
on the basis of race prior to the enactment of Title VII should not now be permitted to utilize
neutral criteria which perpetuate his past discrimination. Contra, International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 45 U.S.L.W. 4506 (U.S. 1977). But if society has discriminated
against blacks by subjecting them to arrests in far greater proportion than their numbers,
why should this employer be prohibited from using arrests as a criterion for employment when
he was in no way responsible for the past discrimination? For a position similar to this, see
Meany, Chicago Trib., Aug. 31, 1975, at 1, col. 1. The Supreme Court answered this argument
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971): "The touchstone is business necessity.
If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related
to job performance, the practice is prohibited."
23. 1973 LEGAL SERVICES MANUAL FOR TITLE VII LMGATION 41-42 [hereinafter cited as
LITIGATION MANUAL]. The EEOC guidelines provide:
An examination of charges of discrimination filed with the Commission and an
evaluation of the results of the Commission's compliance activities has revealed a
decided increase in total test usage and a marked increase in doubtful testing
practices which, based on our experience, tend to have discriminatory effects. In
many cases, persons have come to rely almost exclusively on tests as the basis for
making the decision to hire, transfer, promote, grant membership, train, refer or
retain, with the result that candidates are selected or rejected on the basis of a
single test score. Where tests are so used, minority candidates frequently experience
disproportionately high rates of rejection by failing to attain score levels that have
been established as minimum standards for qualification.
It has also become clear that in many instances persons are using tests as the
basis for employment decisions without evidence that they are valid predictors of

1977]

Employment Testing

have been the most frequently challenged neutral practice in employment litigation. 5 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"5 the Supreme
Court unanimously held that Title VII forbids the use of employemployee job performance. Where evidence in support of presumed relationships
between test performance and job behavior is lacking, the possibility of discrimination in the application of test results must be recognized. A test lacking demonstrated validity (i.e., having no known significant relationship to job behavior) and
yielding lower scores for classes protected by title VII may result in the rejection of
many who have necessary qualifications for successful work performance.
29 C.F.R. § 1607.1(b) (1975).
It is known that the mean scores for blacks are lower than the mean scores for whites on
most general ability, intelligence, aptitude, learning ability, or overall ability pencil and
paper tests. 1970 PERSONNEL TESTING AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 3. See Bannister, Slater
& Radzan, The Use of Cognitive Tests in Nursing Candidate Selection, 36 OCCUPATIONAL
PSYCH. 75 (1962); Kirkwood, Selection Techniques and the Law: To Test or Not to Test?, 44
PERSONNEL 18 (Nov.-Dec. 1967); Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under FairEmployment Laws: A GeneralApproach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 1598, 1639 (1969). In Cooper & Sobol, supra, the authors contend that there "is substantial evidence that blacks and other disadvantaged groups tend to perform worse on general
aptitude tests than whites."
The literature discussing testing and minority groups is voluminous. See, e.g., Ash, Fair
Employment Practices Commission Experiences with Psychological Testing, 20 AM. PSYCH.
797 (Sept. 1965); Ash, Race, Employment Tests and Equal Opportunity (paper presented
at the Conference of National Association of Intergroup Relations Officers in Chicago, Illinois,
Oct. 21, 1965); Barrett, Differential Selection Among Applicants from Different SocioEconomic Ethnic Backgrounds, in SELECTING & TRAINING NEGROES FOR MANAGERIAL POSITIONS
(1965); Clark, Color, Class, Personality and Juvenile Delinquency, 28 J. NEGRO EDUC. 24
(1959); Deutsch & Brown, Social Influences in Negro-White Intelligence Differences, 20 J.
Soc. ISSUES 24 (Apr. 1964); Dreger & Miller, Recent Research in Psychological Comparisons
of Negroes and Whites in the United States (paper presented to the Southeastern Psychological Association in Atlanta, Georgia, Apr. 2, 1965); Katz, Review of Evidence Relating to
Effects of Desegregation on the Intellectual Performance of Negroes, 19 AM. PSYCH. 381
(1964); Krug, The Problem of CulturalBias in Selection, in SELECTING AND TRAINING NEGROES
FOR MANAGERIAL POSITIONS (1965);

ANTI-DEFAMATION

LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, RACE AND

(M. Tumin ed. 1963). See also Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and
Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARv. EDUC. REV. 1 (1969); Ruch, Comments on Psychological
Testing, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 608 (1969).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1975) defines test as follows:
For the purpose of the guidelines in this part, the term "test" is defined as any
paper-and-pencil or performance measure used as a basis for any employment
decision. The guidelines in this part apply, for example, to ability tests which are
designed to measure eligibility for hire, transfer, promotion, membership, training,
referral or retention. This definition includes, but is not restricted to, measures of
general intelligence, mental ability and learning ability; specific intellectual abilities; mechanical, clerical, and other aptitudes; dexterity and coordination; knowledge and proficiency; occupational and other interests; and attitudes, personality
or temperament. The term "test" includes all formal, scored, quantified or standardized techniques of assessing job suitability including, in addition to the above,
specific qualifying or disqualifying personal history or background requirements,
specific educational or work history requirements, scored interviews, biographical
information blanks, interviewers' rating scales, scored application forms, etc.
25. LITIGATION MANUAL, supra note 23, at 42; see cases cited in note 21 supra.
26. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
INTELLIGENCE
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ment tests that are discriminatory in form unless the employer
meets "the burden of showing that any given requirement [has]
a manifest relationship to the employment in question."2 7 Most
recently in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,28 the Court elaborated
upon this principle:
This burden arises, of course, only after the complaining party or
class has made out a prima facie case of discrimination, i.e., has
shown that the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool
of applicants. .

.

.If an employer does then meet the burden of

proving that its tests are "job related," it remains open to the
complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices,
without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the
employer's legitimate interest in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship." . . . Such a showing would be evidence that the em-

ployer was using its tests merely as a "pretext" for discrimination.29

EEOC guidelines define discrimination in the testing context as
the use of any test which adversely affects hiring, promotion,
transfer or any other employment or membership opportunity of
classes protected by title VII . . .unless: (a) the test has been

validated and evidences a high degree of utility as hereinafter described, and (b) the person giving or acting upon the results of the
particular test can demonstrate that alternative suitable hiring,
transfer, or promotion procedures are unavailable for his use."
Presently, if a complaining party shows that any performance measure used as a criterion for employment, promotion, transfer or any
other employment opportunity has an adverse effect upon classes
protected by Title VII, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify
its use.
Validating Occupational Tests
To assist an employer in establishing that a particular test is job
related, the EEOC has issued guidelines for such determinations
27. Id. at 432.
28. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
29. Id. at 425.
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1975). There is obviously a conflict between the guidelines and
the Supreme Court's decision in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). Under
the guidelines the burden is placed upon the person giving or acting upon the results of a
particular test to demonstrate that alternative suitable hiring, promotion, or transfer procedures are unavailable for his use, while Albemarle places that burden upon the complaining
party. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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through professional validation studies." Although the EEOC
guidelines are not administrative "regulations" formulated pursuant to procedures established by Congress, the Supreme Court
'3
has indicated that they are "entitled to great deference.
Thus, when an employer wishes to utilize a particular test to
select from among candidates for a position, the test should be
validated, where technically feasible, 33 "for each minority group
with which it is used; that is, any differential rejection rates that
may exist, based on a test, must be relevant to performance on the
'34
jobs in question.
Under the guidelines, in order to validate a test-that is, to show
that the test is an adequate predictor of performance on a particular
job-an employer must have empirical evidence based upon studies
employing generally accepted procedures for determining validity,
such as those promulgated by the American Psychological Association. 3 The guidelines suggest several methods for validating em3
ployment tests. 1
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1975). The guidelines are authorized by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e12(a) (1970). Similar guidelines have been issued by the Secretary of Labor for the use of
federal contractors. 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.1 to 3.18 (1976); see Note, Federal Contract Compliance:
Use of Special ContractProvisions to Encourage Minority Employment, 8 Loy. Chi. L.J. 913
(1977). See also the proposed guidelines prepared by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Coordinating Council, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,016 (July 14, 1976), which have not been endorsed by
the EEOC, a member of that council.
32. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(b) (1975) provides:
The term "technically feasible" as used in these guidelines means having or
obtaining a sufficient number of minority individuals to achieve findings of statistical and practical significance, the opportunity to obtain unbiased job performance
criteria, etc. It is the responsibility of the person claiming absence of technical
feasibility to positively demonstrate evidence of this absence.
34. Id. § 1607.4(a).
35. Id. § 1607.8 provides:
(a) Under no circumstances will the general reputation of a test, its author or its
publisher or casual reports of test utility be accepted in lieu of evidence of validity.
Specifically ruled out are: assumptions of validity based on test names or descriptive labels; all forms of promotional literature; data bearing on the frequency of a
test's usage; testimonial statements of sellers, users or consultants; and other nonempirical or anecdotal amounts of testing practices or testing outcomes.
(b) Although professional supervision of testing activities may help greatly to
insure technically sound and nondiscriminatory test usage, such involvement alone
shall not be regarded as constituting satisfactory evidence of test validity.
36. Id. § 1607.5 provides:
(a) For the purpose of satisfying the requirements of this part, empirical evidence in support of a test's validity must be based on studies employing generally
accepted procedures for determining criterion-related validity, such as those described in "Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and Manuals" published by American Psychological Association, 1200 17th Street N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20036. Evidence of content or construct validity, as defined in that publica-
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tion, may also be appropriate where criterion-related validity is not feasible. However, evidence for content or construct validity should be accompanied by sufficient
information from job analyses to demonstrate the relevance of the content (in the
case of job knowledge or proficiency tests) or the construct (in the case of trait
measures). Evidence of content validity alone may be acceptable for well-developed
tests that consist of suitable samples of the essential knowledge, skills or behaviors
composing the job in question. The types of knowledge, skills or behaviors contemplated here do not include those which can be acquired in a brief orientation to the
job.
(b) Although any appropriate validation strategy may be used to develop such
empirical evidence, the following minimum standards, as applicable, must be met
in the research approached in the presentation of results which constitute evidence
of validity:
(1) Where a validity study is conducted in which tests are administered to
applicants, with criterion data collected later, the sample of subjects must be
representative of the normal or typical candidate group for the job or jobs in question. This further assumes that the applicant sample is representative of the minority population available for the job or jobs in question in the local labor market.
Where a validity study is conducted in which tests are administered to present
employees, the sample must be representative of the minority groups currently
included in the applicant population. If it is not technically feasible to include
minority employees in validation studies conducted on the present work force, the
conduct of a validation study without minority candidates does not relieve any
person of his subsequent obligation for validation when inclusion of minority candidates becomes technically feasible.
(2) Tests must be administered and scored under controlled and standardized
conditions, with proper safeguards to protect the security of test scores and to insure
that scores do not enter into any judgments of employee adequacy that are to be
used as criterion measures. Copies of test and test manuals, including instructions
for administration, scoring, and interpretation of test results, that are privately
developed and/or are not available through normal commercial channels must be
included as a part of the validation evidence.
(3) The work behaviors or other criteria of employee adequacy which the test
is intended to predict or identify must be fully described; and, additionally, in the
case of rating techniques, the appraisal form(s) and instructions to the rater(s)
must be included as a part of the validation evidence. Such criteria may include
measures other than actual work proficiency, such as training time, supervisory
ratings, regularity of attendance and tenure. Whatever criteria are used they must
represent major or critical work behaviors as revealed by careful job analyses.
(4) In view of the possibility of bias inherent in subjective evaluations, supervisory rating techniques should be carefully developed, and the ratings should be
closely examined for evidence of bias. In addition, minorities might obtain unfairly
low performance criterion scores for reasons other than supervisor's prejudice, as
when, as new employees, they have had less opportunity to learn job skills. The
general point is that all criteria need to be examined to insure freedom from factors
which would unfairly depress the scores of minority groups.
(5) Differential validity. Data must be generated and results separately reported for minority and nonminority groups wherever technically feasible. Where
a minority group is sufficiently large to constitute an identifiable factor in the local
labor market, but validation data have not been developed and presented separately for that group, evidence of satisfactory validity based on other groups will
be regarded as only provisional compliance with these guidelines pending separate
validation of the test for the minority group in question. (See § 1607.9). A test which
is differentially valid may be used in groups for which it is valid but not for those
in which it is not valid. In this regard, where a test is valid for two groups but one
group characteristically obtains higher test scores than the other without a corre-
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Criterion-related validity, the preferred method of validation
under the guidelines,37 includes two types of validation: predictive
validation and concurrent validation. Predictive validation consists
of testing all applicants for a given job for a period of time and hiring
some of those applicants, but not using the test results as a basis
for selection. Criteria of job success are gathered from those hired
after a reasonable period of time on the job. It is then determined
whether there is a significant correlation 38 between those who scored
higher on the test and those who perform better on the job.3" If there
sponding difference in job performance, cutoff scores must be set so as to predict
the same probability of job success in both groups.
(c) In assessing the utility of a test the following considerations will be applicable:
(1) The relationship between the test and at least one relevant criterion must
be statistically significant. This ordinarily means that the relationship should be
sufficiently high as to have a probability of no more than 1 to 20 to have occurred
by chance. However, the use of a single test as the sole selection device will be
scrutinized closely when that test is valid against only one component of job performance.
(2) In addition to statistical significance, the relationship between the test and
criterion should have practical significance. The magnitude of the relationship
needed for practical significance or usefulness is affected by several factors, including:
(i) The larger the proportion of applicants who are hired for or placed on the
job, the higher the relationship needs to be in order to be practically useful. Conversely, a relatively low relationship may prove useful when proportionately few job
vacancies are available;
(ii) The larger the proportion of applicants who become satisfactory employees
when not selected on the basis of the test, the higher the relationship needs to be
between the test and a criterion of job success for the test to be practically useful.
Conversely, a relatively low relationship may prove useful when proportionately few
applicants turn out to be satisfactory;
(iii) The smaller the economic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant relative to the risks entailed in rejecting a qualified applicant, the
greater the relationship needs to be in order to be practically useful. Conversely, a
relatively low relationship may prove useful when the former risks are relatively
high.
37. See id. § 1607.5(a) set out at note 36 supra.
38. Ascertaining whether there is a significant correlation between performance on a test
and performance on a job is a technique of statistical analysis beyond the scope of this article.
The matter is covered in the guidelines at id. § 1607.5(c); see note 36 supra.
39. Of course, frequently difficulties arise in determining what constitutes criteria of job
success. One could use such criteria as turnover, absenteeism, or tardiness, but while these
may be necessary elements of a "good employee" they certainly are not sufficient. Moreover,
in low-level jobs it is possible that the more creative or better employees are likely to leave.
However, predicting long tenure on a job is a sensible goal of a selection procedure.
Other criteria that can be used as criteria of job performance are salary progression, productivity, achievement on certain proficiency tests, or ratings by supervisors and co-workers. Of
course, there is always the possibility of bias being built into ratings of job performance. One
must be particularly sensitive to this problem when a group of predominantly black employees in a unit are rated by a white supervisor. This point is emphased in 29 C.F.R. §
1607.5(b)(4) (1975); see note 36 supra.
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is a significant correlation between the test scores and the performance level on a particular job, the test has been shown to have
predictive validity for that job and it can be used without violating
Title VH.If this method of validation is used, the sample of subjects
must be representative of the typical candidate group for the jobs
in question. In addition, the applicant sample must be representative of the minority population available for the jobs in the local
labor market.4 0
The method generally known as concurrent validation utilizes a
similar approach. When using this method, both criteria of job success and performance levels are obtained from employees already on
the job. It is then determined whether there is a significant correlation between those who have done well on the test and those who
have done well on significant aspects of the job." When this method
of validation is used, the sample of present employees must be
representative of the minority group included in the applicant population. 2 If it is not technically feasible to include minority employees in the validation studies conducted on the present work force,
the studies must be re-evaluated when minority subjects are available.
Where either method of criterion-related validation is not feasible, evidence of content or construct validation may be used.' Content validation is a process whereby a test is constructed which
contains questions which are a representative sample of all of the
tasks performed on the job," while construct validation consists of
determining which attributes, characteristics, or trait measures are
useful on a particular job, and then devising a test which measures
those characteristics. 5
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(1) (1975); see note 36 supra.
41. See Vulcan Soc'y of the N.Y. City Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d
387 (2d Cir. 1973).
42. See Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1975); see also
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Anna [current] 13 Empl. Prac. Dec.
$ 11,308 (C.D. Cal. 1976) where the feasibility of one testing procedure over another appears
to be more stringently applied to public sector employers.
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(1) (1975); see note 36 supra.
44. Id. at § 1607.5(b); see note 36 supra. However, courts have rejected the use of content or construct validity in the absence of proof that a criterion-related validity study was
not feasible. See Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1975); W. Addition
Community Organization v. Alioto, 360 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Bridgeport Guardians
v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n., 354 F. Supp. 778 (D. Conn. 1973), modified
on other grounds, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp. 721
(D. Minn. 1972).
45. One court has said, "It is likely that such a showing [of content validity] could be
made only in regard to simple, narrowly-defined jobs; perhaps the best example is steno-
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A fundamental principle reflected in the guidelines is that a test
may be a valid predictor of performance for one racial group but not
for another." This principle, known as differential validity, can be
explained by several factors. Tests generally have been developed
with whites from middle-class homes as the model subject, and they
often assume a common experiential background. Where blacks
have neither the same cultural nor educational experiences as do
whites, it is possible that a particular test has a different degree of
validity for blacks than for whites. 7
The guidelines accept the thesis of differential validity and require a person relying upon a particular test to generate data and
to report results separately for minority and non-minority groups,
wherever technically feasible. A test which is differentially valid
may be used for groups for which it is valid, but not for those groups
for which it is not valid."
Obviously, from what has been said, validating a test requires the
assistance of an expert, and it can be time-consuming and expensive.49 However, if a particular test is shown to affect adversely
members of a minority group and the evidence is not rebutted by
proof of the test's validity, the use of the test will most probably be
found unlawful. 0 But even when evidence of validation has been
presented, courts frequently have held the evidence of validation
insufficient, thus rendering the use of such tests impermissible."
graphic jobs." Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1975). But see Coopersmith
v. Roudebush, 517 F.2d 818, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(5) (1975); see note 36 supra.
47. Although the guidelines have presumed that differential validity may occur with
sufficient frequency to require employers to validate their selection criteria for each minority
group separately from the majority, experts are in disagreement about the reliability of
differential validity. One commentator has stated that differential validity is an "hypothesis
for which, at the present time, there is insufficient factual evidence to confirm or deny with
confidence." Ruch & Ash, Comments on Psychological Testing, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 608, 611
(1969). Boehm, Negro-White Differences in Validity of Employment and Training Selection
Procedures,56 J. Applied Psych. 1, 33-39 (1972) (only seven cases of differential validity out
of 60 significant validity coefficients reported in 13 separate studies of Negro/Caucasian
selection).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(5) (1975); see note 36 supra.
49. "The cost of a single [validation] study may range up to $20,000, although most cost
less than $5,000. The money and manpower required add up significantly when a company
has to validate the same test for several jobs or revalidate its procedures periodically, as the
EEOC sometimes requires. . . . Danny Moffie, a business professor at the University of
North Carolina . . . estimates that Duke Power will eventually have to complete 10 to 15
validation studies at costs ranging up to $15,000 to $20,000 each." Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 1975,
at 19, col. 1.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 455-57 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 327 F. Supp.
1034 (E.D. Va. 1971); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970).
51. See, e.g., Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
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In light of these decisions, some commentators have concluded
that the language of the guidelines is too stringent." One psychologist has suggested that the guidelines are so rigorous that only one
in twenty corporations could adequately validate a test for different
53
races.
Many employers feel that the testing guidelines are so rigorous,
expensive, and time-consuming that they have decided to return to
the "seat-of-the-pants approach" to hiring and promotion." Thus,
although an author in 1971 stated that "testing has rapidly increased in prominence,"5 5 at least one writer has more recently concluded that "the use of testing is declining sharply in American
business for reasons that have little to do with its accuracy. Testing's biggest stumbling block now is the Equal Employment Opportunities [sic] Commission (EEOC) and its guidelines on job placement."5 In fact, when "applied strictly, the testing requirements
are impossible for many employers to follow."57
To avoid the difficulties encountered in justifying the validity of
employment tests, many defendants have concentrated their efforts
on attempts to demonstrate that the use of a particular test does not
adversely affect minority group members. However, such defenses
have often met with little success.5 9 Other employers, fearing litigaGa. Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers, 401
F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp. 721 (D. Minn. 1972).
At times, however, courts have approved validation studies done by employers. See, e.g.,
Sims v. Local 65, Sheet Metal Workers, 489 F.2d 1023, 1025 (6th Cir. 1973).
52. See Developments in the Law-Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv.L. REv. 1109, 1128-31 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments
-Title VIII.
53. Barrett, Grey Areas in Black and White Testing, 46 HAJv. Bus. REv. 92, 94 (Jan-Feb.
1968).
54. Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
55. Developments-Title VII, supra note 52, at 1121. The authors do note, however, that
the growth of testing "may not have been so spectacular since the passage of Title VII.
Id.
56. Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 1975, at 1, col. 6; see N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1975, § E, at 9, cols.
3-4.
57. Developments- Title VII, supra note 52, at 1131. Of course, it is possible that employers have difficulty in validating tests because tests are poor predictors of job performance.
See, e.g., E. GHISELLI, THE VALIDITY OF OCCUPATIONAL APTITUDE TEsTs 137 (1966); D. SUPER &
J. CRITEs, APPRAIsING VOCATIONAL FITNESS 106 (rev. ed. 1962). Cooper & Sobol, supra note 23,
at 1643: "But a paper and pencil test asking general questions does not necessarily measure
the relevant mental capacity. It measures the capacity to answer the questions on the test.
This may or may not be related to the capacity to perform well on particular jobs."
58. See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Bd. of Examiners,
458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426
U.S. 229 (1976). See also Comment, Washington v. Davis: Splitting the Causes of Action
Against Racial Discriminationin Employment, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 225 (1976).
59. See note 58 supra. But cf. cases cited in note 60 infra.
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tion, have abandoned or greatly reduced their testing programs. 0
Recently, however, one of the largest publishers of personnel tests
has suggested an inexpensive method of selecting employees for
hire, promotion, or transfer whereby employers could continue employment testing, without validation, and without violating Title
VII.6' This method, known as the "Percentile Within Normative
Class Method of Selecting Employees" (Percentile Method), is intended to relieve employers of the burdens of validation and to
diminish the likelihood of litigation. Since many employers would
like to continue using personnel tests, they may ultimately wish to
adopt this alternative to the expensive and time-consuming validation process set forth in the EEOC and OFCC guidelines. Adoption
of the Percentile Method would undoubtedly affect employees
throughout the United States.
The following section will explain the Percantile Method. The
method then will be critically evaluated to determine its ability to
withstand challenge under Title VII.
THE PERCENTILE METHOD

Background
Probably the most widely used of all intelligence tests is the Wonderlic Personnel Test.6" It consists of fifty questions, takes twelve
minutes to complete and "can be administered by any well-trained
clerk." 3 Wonderlic himself describes the test as follows:
The Personnel Test is not "just a simple list of questions." It is
a job sample about which we know many things. First of all, it was
scientifically constructed following a very complicated formula.
Many thousands of people were tested and retested before it was
established. Many hundreds of hours of psychological research
were necessary to make it simple and still effective.
As a result of this research, we know within reliable statistical
variation that no matter how many times applicants take the test,
60. Wall St. J.,Sept. 3, 1975, at 19, col. 1. The EEOC believes that businesses are
overreacting. Id. Support for the EEOC's position can be found in some cases which have
upheld validation studies done by employers. See, e.g., Coopersmith v. Roudebush, 517 F.2d
818, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Sims v. Local 65, Sheet Metal Workers, 489 F.2d 1023, 1025 (6th
Cir. 1973); Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
61. E. WONDERLIC, WONDERLIC PERSONNEL TEST MANUAL (1975) [hereinafter cited as
WONDERLIC].

62. Developments-Title VII, supra note 52, at 1121: "The Wonderlic Test is used by over
55% of all companies in the United States employing more than 1600 employees." Note, Legal
Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and Education, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 691 (1968).
63. WONDERLIC, supra note 61, at 2.
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it is unlikely that they would improve their comparative position
on it. The Test does measure some very real and important human
traits. The questions get progressively more difficult. As applicants
go through the test, they meet with various types of problems:
problems that expose their ability to (1) understand and think in
terms of words, (2) understand and think in terms of numbers, (3)
think in terms of symbols and (4) think in terms of ideas.
As applicants take the examination, they are compared with
others on their ability to carefully follow detailed directions; to do
arithmetic problems; and compared on their ability to analyze
geometric figures. Other types of items presented to them include
analogies, disarranged sentences, definitions, judgment, direction
following items using clerical data, spatial relation items, etc ....
Thus, a wide variety of questions commonly found in a mental
ability test are presented to the applicant."
In discussing what can be learned from the test, Wonderlic asserts:
Not every job requires the same degree of problem solving, nor is
every job as complex as some. What is needed, is to establish
passing or so-called critical scores for various occupations. This
should be done for each company since job titles are not completely
descriptive. They are known to vary from plant to plant even
within the same organization. Also, the critical score-the passing
score-must be moved up or down, depending upon the available
supply of applicants. 5
However, Wonderlic does provide minimum scores "established in
many industries."66
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
For example, Wonderlic recommends the following minimum raw scores for the posi-

tions listed:
Administrator-Executive .... 30
Engigeer ..................
29
Accountant ...............
28
Programmer ...........
28
Manager-Supervisor ........ 27
Salesman-Field Representative .....................
26
Computer Operator ......... 25
Secretary ..................
25
Accounting Clerk ...........
25
Writer, News, ete ..........
25
Sales & Service-Customer
Service ..................
24
Technician .................
24
Stenographer ..............
24
Cashier ....................
24
Forem an ...................
24
Bookkeeper ................ 23

Draftsman .................

23

Receptionist ................
23
Office, General .............
23
Student-Part Time Employee.23
Lineman, Utility ............
22
Teller .....................
22
Typist .....................
21
Clerk-Clerical ..............
20
Key Punch Operator ........
20
Police-Patrolman ...........
20
Skilled Labor & Trades ..... 20
File Clerk .................
19
Maintenance ................ 18
Telephone Operator ........
18
Unskilled Labor ............
16
Nurses Aide ...............
15
Warehouseman ............
15
Custodian ..................
8

19771

Employment Testing

Perhaps because of its widespread use, the Wonderlic Personnel
Test, as of 1969, was the test most frequently challenged on the
ground that it was discriminatory. 7 Moreover, challenges to its use
have increased, 8 and the number of decisions holding that its use
did, in fact, have an adverse impact upon minority groups" has been
a special concern of employers.
EliminatingAdverse Impact as a Method of Avoiding Test
Validation
In 1970, in response to the many administrative and judicial decisions invalidating the Wonderlic Test, research was conducted on a
sample of 38,452 black job applicants taken from a total sample of
251,253 persons for the purpose of determining (a) whether, in fact,
the Wonderlic Personnel Test did have an adverse impact upon
Negroes, (b) whether any statistical patterns could be ascertained,
and (c) if the test adversely affected Negroes, whether anything
could be done to eliminate that adverse impact. 0 The results of that
research confirmed what courts have long held:
[A] very stable differential in raw scores achieved by Negro Applicant Populations exists. Where Education, Sex, Age, Region of
Country, and/or Position Applied For are held constant, NegroCaucasian Wonderlic personnel score differentials are consistently
observed. These mean score differentials are, as other researchers
have noted in the study of mental ability, about one standard
deviation apart when comparisons of Caucasians and Negroes are
studied."
Later research bolstered similar hypotheses with respect to the
Id. at 19.
67. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 58, at 1642.
68. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Young v. Edgcomb Steel Co., 363 F. Supp. 961 (M.D.N.C. 1973);
Stevenson v. Int'l Paper Co., 352 F. Supp. 230 (S.D. Ala. 1972); Stallworth v. Monsanto Co.,
8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9695 (N.D. Fla. 1974); Button v. Rockefeller, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8835
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973); EEOC Decision 74-28, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6399; EEOC Decision 720996, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6333; EEOC Decision 72-0703, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec.; EEOC Decision
72-0066, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6296; EEOC Decision 71-2344, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6257. It has
been noted that the frequency of challenges to the Wonderlic Personnel Test, and to another
test, the Test of Mechanical Comprehension, may reflect their popularity rather than any
particular vulnerability. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 58, at 1643.
69. Id.
70. "Estimates of the cost of the 1970 research exceed half a million dollars. E. F. Wonderlic & Associates, Inc. directly contributed $155,000 to the project, while it is estimated
that the contributing companies ... spent in excess of $350,000 to bring this statistical data
together." E. F. Wonderlic & Associates, Inc., Negro Norms: A Study of 38,452 Job Applicants
for Affirmative Actions Program 6 (1972) [hereinafter Negro Norms].
71. Id. at 3.
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Wonderlic Personnel Test scores for other minority groups.7" Thus,
if an employer wished to hire persons for a particular position with
the general mental ability level of the average high school graduate,
as determined by the Wonderlic Personnel Test, use of a single raw
score as a cut-off in determining a job applicant's acceptability
would result in a substantially higher rejection rate of all minority
candidates. To illustrate, a cut-off score of 21, the national average
for high school graduates," would eliminate:
34.9 %
75.1%
67.4%
48.2%
43.7%
54.41%

of all Caucasian applicants;
of all Negro applicants;
of all Spanish Surnamed American applicants;
of all American Indian applicants;
of all Oriental applicants;
74
of all other foreign native language applicants.

Without substantial evidence of validation, and without showing
that alternative suitable employment procedures are unavailable,
the use of the Wonderlic Test in this fashion would be violative of
Title VII, since there is a substantially higher rejection rate of minority applicants. 5
To eliminate this adverse impact, Wonderlic has suggested replacing the use of a single raw score with the use of a multiple raw
score based upon a single percentile standing. The result would be
that the minimum raw score on the Wonderlic Test acceptable for
employment decisions involving Caucasians would be higher than
would be the minimum acceptable score for minority groups. 76 To
arrive at the minimum raw score necessary for the hire, promotion,
or transfer of any particular individual, that person's raw score
would be determined by reference to a table of norms for his or her
racial, ethnic, or nationality class and by locating the raw score
which corresponds to his or her percentile standing.
For example, if an employer wished to hire persons with the gen72. Spanish Surnamed American, Oriental, American Indian and Other Foreign Native
Language Norms 3 (1971) [hereinafter Minority Norms].

73.

WONDERLIC,

supra note 61, at 5.

74. Minority Norms, supra note 72, at 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26.
75. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1975); see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
76. Similar, although not so elaborate, suggestions have been made by others. See Developments-Title VII, supra note 53, at 1130 stating, "Because of the impracticality of the
validation and alternative showing requirements, and the fact that the Commission will
scrutinize closely higher rejection rates for minority candidates than non-minority candidates," the easiest way for an employer to stay out of trouble and to avoid extensive validation
techniques is to hire an acceptable proportion of blacks by applying a lower cutoff score to
black applicants. See also Note, Legal Implications of the Use of StandardizedAbility Tests
in Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691, 705 (1968).

Employment Testing

19771

eral mental ability of the average high school graduate, he would see
that the raw score of twenty-one corresponds to forty-eight percent
under the cumulative percentile standing for all job applicants regardless of race, national origin, or ethnic background." Using the
Percentile Method, the employer would then turn to separate tables
for that person's racial, ethnic, or nationality class and would find
the following raw scores to approximate the forty-eighth percentile:
48TH PERCENTILE MINIMUM TEST PERFORMANCE"M

Normative Class

Percent
Eliminated

Raw Score

Caucasian
23
50%
Negro
15
51'
Spanish Surnamed American
16
48 '/
American Indian
20
48 %
Oriental
49%
Thus, instead of using a single raw score for all persons taking the
test, a multiple raw score based upon a single percentile standing
is used. In the above example, when hiring a Caucasian with the
mental ability of a high school graduate as measured by the Wonderlic Test, an employer would require a raw score of twenty-three
points out of fifty, but when hiring a Negro with the mental ability
of a high school graduate, fifteen points would be required. In this
way, the disparate effect of the test would be "compensated for
through the use of percentile evaluation of normative groups or
through the use of point conversions .... ,,9
Point conversions work in a similar fashion. As Wonderlic states:
To generalize, point conversions to correct for
disparate effect based upon total populations are as
follows:
Negro to Caucasian .......
Spanish Surnamed American
to Caucasian ..........
Oriental to Caucasian ......
Indian to Caucasian ........
Other Foreign Native Tongue
to Caucasian ..........
77.

78.
79.
80.

.8 points
......
.........
.........

supra note 61, at 16.
Minority Norms, supra note 72, at 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26.
WONDERLIC,

6 points
2 points
2 points

...
4 points80
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Consider the following example. An employer wishes to hire three
sales people. In the past he has always required people in sales to
come from the upper two-thirds percentile as measured by the Wonderlic Test. The raw score of eighteen points most nearly corresponds to 33.33 percent under the cumulative percentile standing
for all job applicants, regardless of race, national origin, or ethnic
background." However, the employer wishes to eliminate the disparate impact of the Wonderlic Test. By using the above-mentioned
point conversions, the employer would add eight points to all black
applicants' scores and six points to the scores of all Spanish surnamed applicants. As a result, the minimum raw scores on the
Wonderlic Test necessary for hire as a sales person are:
N egro ................................ 10 points
Spanish Surnamed American ............. 12 points
Caucasian ............................. 18 points
Thus, if the Percentile Method is used, the rejection rate is essentially the same for all job applicants regardless of race, ethnic background or national origin.12 Moreover, the individuals passing the
minimum test performance requirements of the employer have the
general mental ability, as measured by the Wonderlic Test, associated with others of their respective normative groups. Wonderlic
states:
The utilization of percentile scores of proper normative group
classifications, in our professional opinion, will eliminate any disparate effect and therefore satisfies the Title VU requirements of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC and OFCC Guidelines and
the principles set forth in the Supreme Court Decision of Willie S.
Griggs et al. vs. Duke Power Co. 3
However, although Wonderlic believes the previously discussed
point conversions to be "valid generalizations," he recognizes that
"smallef score conversions are indicated when the data is controlled
for individual positions. The point conversion is based on score differentials between the total populations. This conversion will most
often over-correct when applied to an applicant for a specific position."'" For this reason, the application of point conversions must
81. WONDERLC, supra note 61, at 16.
82. This can be seen in the earlier example whereby using a multiple raw score based upon
the forty-eighth percentile on the test, the rejection rate was 50% for Caucasians, 51% for
Negroes, 48% for Spanish Surnamed Americans, 48% for American Indians, and 49% for
Orientals. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
83. Negro Norms, supra note 70, at 2; Minority Norms, supra note 72, at 2.
84. Minority Norms, supra note 72, at 4.
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be tailored to the position for which an applicant has applied."
Assume again that an employer wishes to hire three sales persons
yet avoid the disparate impact of the Wonderlic Test. Again, the
raw score of eighteen points most nearly corresponds to 33.33 percent under the cumulative percentile standing for all job applicants,
regardless of race, national origin, or ethnic background. By turning
to the table entitled "Test Scores By Position Applied For"' he will
ascertain the "mean point conversion to Caucasian scores" for persons of different race, national origin, or ethnic background. By
using that table the employer must add 7.90 points to all black
applicants' scores and 9.58 points to the scores of all Spanish surnamed applicants. As a result, the minimum scores necessary for
hire as a sales person are:
....
.......... .......... 10 .10
...... ......
N egro ......... ....
Spanish Surnamed American ............................ 8.42
C aucasian ............................................. 18.00
It is this method that Wonderlic maintains is the most reliable
for assessing mental ability, while at the same time complying with
the requirements of Title VII. Wonderlic has stated:
85. Wonderlic has analyzed test scores by job title broken down by race, national origin,
and ethnic background. The results of this research are found in tables which indicate "Test
Scores By Position Applied For." Some information learned from these tables is as follows:
Mean Point
Conversion to
Caucasian
Scores

Position
Applied For

Arithmetic
Average

Sales
Sales
Sales

18.58
26.48
16.90

7.90

Sales

23.77

2.71

Negro
Caucasian
Spanish Surnamed
Americans
American Indian

Sales
Sales

21.00
22.00

6.48
4.48

Oriental
Other Foreign

Mail Clerk

15.26

6.49

Language
Negro

Mail Clerk

21.75

Mail Clerk

17.07

4.68

Mail Clerk
Mail Clerk

10.00
21.00

17.75
.75

Mail Clerk

19.66

4.68

9.58

Caucasian
Spanish Surnamed

Americans

Negro Norms, supra note 70; Minority Norms, supra note 73.
86. See table at note 85 supra.

American Indian
Oriental

Other Foreign
Language
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The Wonderlic Personnel Test has long been recognized as a
reliable measure of mental ability. Extensive validation research
and usage by personnel executives over many years has confirmed
the value and accuracy of the measures. The Courts have acknowledged this. Their concern about the "Disparate Effect" on minority populations has been answered here. 7
A Critical Evaluation
The Percentile Method may, however, be subject to serious challenge on the basis of reverse discrimination. In order to evaluate the
challenge consider the following example. An employer wishes to
hire one employee for a sales position and he always requires employees in sales to come from the upper one-third percentile of all
job applicants, as measured by the Wonderlic Test.The employer
gives the test to six applicants and gets the following results:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Negro
Caucasian
Negro

18
16
15
13
12
11

The employer looks to Wonderlic's table entitled "Test Scores By
Position Applied For" and ascertains that he should add 7.90 points
to the scores of all blacks applying for a sales position. By so doing,
the black applicant who performed fourth best on the test, with a
score of thirteen, is hired because his examination score is 20.90
after points are added in accordance with the Percentile Method. A
suit is brought against the employer by a white applicant who
scored eighteen on the Wonderlic Test, alleging that but for his race
he would have been hired for the sales position.
The Case Law
The first reported case to consider the Percentile Method was
Young v. Edgcomb Steel Co."5 There, plaintiff, a forty-one year
old black'male who had completed three years at A & T Technical
87. Minority Norms, supra note 72, at 4; Negro Norms, supra note 70, at 4.
88. It must be emphasized that this article focuses on problems of employment testing
and reverse discrimination under the civil rights statutes. The legal standards in those cases
are different from those utilized where public employers are involved and constitutional tests
are employed. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089
(5th Cir. 1975).
89. 363 F. Supp. 961 (M.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd & rem'd in part on other
grounds, 499 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1974).
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Institute and who had worked for defendant for fourteen years as a
shear operator was denied a transfer to a sales position because of
his score on the Wonderlic Test. 0 Defendant's use of the test had
not been validated and was challenged by the plaintiff as being
racially discriminatory. The court found defendant's use of the test
to have a racially discriminatory effect which was not shown to be
job-related and which did not comply with the Testing and Selecting Employee Guidelines of the EEOC.9 ' In enjoining the defendant's use of the test, the court stated:
The discriminatory impact of the Wonderlic Test has been
widely noted particularly in the wake of the Supreme Court decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co ...

Moreover, from a study, in which 251,253 job applicants, including 38,452 blacks, took the Wonderlic Test, the creators of the test
determined that it discriminated against blacks. .

.

. There is

nothing in the evidence of this case which suggests that the defendant ever took account of the discriminatory impact of the
test ... .92

Of course, Young did not raise the question of the effects of the
Percentile Method upon white employees or applicants for employment. However, the underscored language seems to suggest that
employers utilizing the Wonderlic Test are under a duty to account
for the adverse impact of the Wonderlic Test, perhaps by utilizing
the Percentile Method.
The next case to consider questions similar to those raised in the
Young decision was Mele v. Department of Justice.3 In that case,

plaintiff, a white applicant for an apprentice training position,
brought suit under Title VII alleging that it was illegal for the defendant, in implementing affirmative action obligations under a consent decree with the Government, to utilize an unvalidated employment test with dual scoring. Under this system minority group examinations were separated from those of whites. The top scoring
thirty minority persons and the five white persons scoring highest
in their group were hired. Despite its finding that use of an unvalidated test constitutes discrimination per se,94 the court dismissed
plaintiff's complaint, holding that plaintiff was not a member of the
90. Plaintiff scored six on the test while the defendant considered 19-21 to be a passing
score. Plaintiff took the test under conditions less favorable than those to which whites were
subjected. 363 F. Supp. at 965, 967.
91. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1975).
92. 363 F. Supp. at 965-66.
93. 395 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1975).
94. Id. at 596. The court noted a split in lower court decisions on this question.
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class protected by Title VII and, thus, was not able to invoke the
protection of the EEOC guidelines. In so holding, the court said:
This Court is not unsympathetic to the plaintiff's plight and
recognizes the seeming inequities imposed upon him by reason of
affirmative action. However, such affirmative action programs
have been held to constitute a valid exercise of executive power
and this Court is duty bound to follow the Federal policy in favor
of overcoming the effects of past discrimination by means of affirmative action." 5
Thus, it is not clear whether Mete rests upon the court's determination that Title VII is inapplicable to whites, its determination that
"reverse discrimination" is a proper means of overcoming the effects
of past discrimination where a consent decree is involved, or both.
Although other courts have approved preferential treatment of
both minorities and women upon a finding of prior unlawful discrimination,"6 pursuant to the dictates of a consent decree,97 or pursuant to affirmative action obligations under Executive Order
11,246,

8

to the extent that Mete rests upon the notion that whites

95. Id. at 597.
96. See Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. N.L.
Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); Pa. v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en
banc); United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Int'l Union, Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d
159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); United States v. IBEW Local 38, 428 F.2d
144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969; Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc., v.
Altsbuler, 361 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 957 (1974).
However, in Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 520 F.2d 420 (2d. Cir.),
rehearing en banc denied, 531 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975), the court of appeals promulgated a twofold test for the imposition of temporary quotas. There must be a "clear-cut pattern of longcontinued and egregious racial discrimination." Second, the effect of reverse discrimination
must not be "identifiable," that is to say, concentrated upon a relatively small, ascertainable
group of non-minority persons. 520 F.2d at 427. See also EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal
Workers, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976).
97. See, e.g., EEOC v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1976); United
States v. Wood & Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939
(1973). But cf. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (question
specifically left unresolved). See also McAleer v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 416 F. Supp. 435
(D.D.C. 1976); Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1976);
Note, The Employer's Dilemma: Quotas, Reverse Discrimination, and Voluntary
Compliance, 8 Loy. Cm. L.J. 369 (1977).
98. See, e.g., Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Olgilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Contractors Ass'n v. Shultz, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Barnett v.
Int'l Harvester, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7538 (W.D. Tenn. 1976). But see Germann v. Kipp, 14
Empl. Prac. Dec. 4525, 4535 (W.D. Mo. 1977), asserting in the context of Executive Order
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are not protected by the civil rights statutes, that decision will be
of limited value. Since that case was decided, the United States
Supreme Court rendered its decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
TransportationCo." In that case, two white employees brought suit
alleging race discrimination because they were discharged for misappropriating cargo from company shipments while a black employee, also charged with the same offense, was retained. Reversing
the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that both the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and Title VII prohibit racial discrimination in private
employment against whites as well as nonwhites. 00 Thus, decisional
law has not provided a clear answer as to the permissibility of the
Percentile Method.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE PERCENTILE METHOD

General PreferentialTreatment of Minority Group Persons
To the extent that the Percentile Method is regarded as simply
another means of affording a preference to minority employees and
applicants for employment, it is important briefly to examine the
policy considerations of such preferences. In so doing, however, it is
essential to consider how the courts have reacted to the policy considerations raised.
The obvious problem with all programs which grant preferences
to persons of minority group background is the manifest unfairness
of these programs to the white victims of the preference. This is
11,246, "Employers who undertake voluntary affirmative action walk a thin line ..
"
In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson proclaimed Executive Order No. 11,246, declaring
as a matter of public policy that "affirmative action be taken to rectify discrimination against
minorities" and providing that all federal contractors must agree not to discriminate against
any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965). Executive Order 11,375, effective October 1968, supplemented
the earlier order by forbidding discrimination by federal contractors on the basis of sex. 32
Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967).
Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the Department of Labor on February 5, 1970, issued
Order No. 4, which required each federal contractor to develop a written affirmative action
program. Revised Order No. 4, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1971), imposed additional and more specific
compliance requirements.
99. 427 U.S. 273 (1976); see Haber v. Classen, 540 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1976); Sek v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 421 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Cubas v. Rapid Am. Corp., 420 F. Supp.
663 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
100. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in McDonald, lower federal courts divided on
the applicability of § 1981 to white persons. For cases holding that § 1981 does not apply to
whites, see, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 513 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1975); Balc
v. United Steelworkers, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8948 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.,
366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973). Contra, Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325 (8th Cir.
1971); Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975); Central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894, 901 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
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especially true when laws have been passed to ensure that irrelevancies such as race, color, religion, sex, or national origin will not be
used to deny anyone employment opportunities.'' To the extent
that preferential employment programs are implemented to aid persons of minority group backgrounds, non-minority group persons
will be denied employment opportunities on the basis of their race,
and society will have departed from its avowed moral precept, "each
according to his merit."
Certainly, the economic plight of blacks and other minorities in
this country due largely to deprivation and discrimination is now
legend.102 Under such circumstances, persuasive arguments can be
made that if we are ever going to have equal employment opportuni101.

Section 703 of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to
fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify
or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or applicants for membership or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual,
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate
against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship
or other training.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to (d) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to (d) (Supp. IV
1974).
102. See Sovem, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,62 COLUM.
L. REv. 563 (1962).
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ties for persons of minority group background, it is not sufficient
merely to start now with that premise in the form of antidiscrimination laws. Rather, according to these arguments, what
must be done to assure equality of opportunity is to implement
preferential programs so that persons of minority group backgrounds are able to compete favorably with non-minority group persons in obtaining jobs. 03 That is, because of past discrimination,
minority group persons frequently will be unable to compete for
positions without preferential programs. Similarly, others have
argued that in light of years of discrimination and oppression it is
appropriate to pay compensation or reparations in the form of preferential programs to those victimized by discrimination. 0 ' In short,
so these arguments go, if preferential programs are not instituted,
there may be no hope of narrowing the differences between minority
and non-minority employment opportunities in the United States. 0 5
In response, others have challenged the wisdom of preferential
employment programs for minority group members even as a remedy for past discrimination. Professor Ralph Winter, for example,
has argued:
[P]referential programs are fundamentally counter-educative on
the basic issue of racial discrimination itself. Instead of helping to
eliminate race from politics, they inject it. Instead of teaching
tolerance and helping those forces seeking accommodation, they
divide on a racial basis. Such programs tend to legitimate the
103.

Professor John Kaplan has articulated the argument as follows:
The treatment according to need argument often uses the analogy of a footrace
in which one of the runners has been shackled for the entire time. We could not
simply remove his chains and let the race continue. Not only would he then be far
behind in the race, but also, from want of exercise and various other disabilities he
would be much less able to continue. The thrust of this argument is that the only
treatment consistent with equality is one which does not merely allow the footrace
to proceed but which somehow propels the last place runner back into contention.
Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special
Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 365 (1966).
104. See generally B. BrTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 120 (1973); Hughes,
Reparationsfor Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1063 (1968).
105. Support for this position is found in an analysis of employment statistics in the
United States. For example, in the United States, the Negro unemployment rate has been
substantially higher than that of the rest of the population and the gap in terms of dollars is
widening. From 1951 to 1962, the annual income of Negro male workers increased $963.00
while that of white workers increased by $2,117. See Moynihan, PoliticalPerspectives, in THE
NEGRO CHALLENGE TO THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY

76 (Ginzberg ed. 1964). See also N.Y. Times,

Dec. 5, 1976, § 4, at 7, col. 1; Germann v. Kipp, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4525, 4531 (W.D. Mo.
1977), stating: "whenever there is a limited pool of resources from which minorities have been
disproportionately excluded, equalization of opportunity can only be accomplished by reallocation of those resources. In that process, detriment to non-minorities is inevitable."

712

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 8

back-lash by providing it with much of the philosophical and
moral base from which the civil rights movement itself began.,'
Similarly, Professor John Kaplan has suggested that any attempt
to secure preferential treatment for Negroes in the employment area
will be extremely divisive since those most affected by job preference for Negroes will be second generation Americans and the poor
whites who have most bitterly resented the march of the Negro
toward equality.'
In another but related context, the United States Supreme Court
has answered this argument. In the recent case of Franks v. Bowman TransportationCo., 0 8 the Supreme Court faced a situation
where identifiable black applicants for employment were denied
positions because of their race. As a result, they sought seniority
status retroactive to the dates of their employment applications. In
opposition, the employer argued that an award of retroactive seniority to the class of discriminatees would conflict with the economic
interests of other employees. Rejecting the employer's argument,
the Court said:
[I]t is apparent that denial of seniority relief to identifiable victims of racial discrimination on the sole ground that such relief
diminishes the expectations of other, arguably innocent, employees would if applied generally frustrate the central "make-whole"
objective of Title VII. These conflicting interests of other employees will of course always be present in instances where some scarce
employment benefit is distributed among employees on the basis
of their status in the seniority hierarchy. But, as we have said,
there is nothing in the language of Title VII, or in its legislative
history, to show that Congress intended generally to bar this form
of relief to victims of illegal discrimination, and the experience
under its remedial model in the National Labor Relations Act
points to the contrary. Accordingly, we find untenable the conclusion that this form of relief may be denied merely because the
interests of other employees may thereby be affected. "If relief
under Title VII can be denied merely bcause the majority group
of employees, who have not suffered discrimination, will be unhappy about it, there will be little hope of correcting the wrongs
to which the Act is directed."'"'
106. Winter, Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through Laws Against Discrimination: A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 817, 854 (1967).
107. Kaplan, supra note 103, at 375.
108. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
109. Id. at 774-75, quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d
Cir. 1971). See also Note, The Continuing Validity of Seniority Systems Under Title VII:
Sharing the Burden of Discrimination,8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 882 (1977).
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Of course, differences exist between granting retroactive seniority
to a minority applicant for employment who was himself denied a
position by an employer because of illegal discrimination and the
granting of an artificial preference on an examination to a minority
applicant for employment who was not illegally discriminated
against by the employer giving the examination. However, it remains to be seen how far the Court is willing to extend the rationale
of the Franksdecision. The resolution of these issues ultimately will
turn upon how the courts balance the interests of minority group
persons in eradicating the effects of past discrimination with the
legitimate concerns of non-minority group persons who may be denied positions solely because of their race, at least until such time
that minority group persons are fairly represented in the workforce. 110 This is especially true in light of the Supreme Court's recognition that Title VII prohibits "[d]iscriminatory preference for any
[racial] group, minority or majority.""'
However, it is clear that the issues are complex and the equities
are by no means all on one side. For this reason, courts have frequently been reluctant to enter this area "2 and when they have done
so, they have reached differing conclusions about how best to resolve
the problems." 3 At least one court, in balancing such interests, has
held that temporary quotas should not be used unless there is a
"clear-cut pattern of long-continued and egregious racial discrimination" and unless the effect of reverse discrimination is not concentrated upon a relatively small ascertainable group of non-minority
persons." 4 Obviously, use of the Percentile Method may indeed in110. The tension between these two policy considerations is demonstrated by two
seemingly contradictory provisions of Title VII. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970), which
prohibits "preferential treatment" in hiring practices to correct racial "imbalance," with 42
U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) (1970), which specifically authorizes district courts to order any "affirmative action" which may be appropriate to remedy past discrimination. See also Weber v.
Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976); Germann v. Kipp, 14 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 4525, 4529 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
111. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
112. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), raising similar issues with
respect to preferential law school admissions.
113. Compare the Fifth Circuit's decision in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398
(5th Cir. 1974), with that of the Supreme Court, 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
114. Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 520 F.2d 420, 427 (2d Cir.),
rehearingen banc denied, 531 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975). In Kirkland, the Second Circuit acknowledged that it "approached the use of quotas in a limited and 'gingerly' fashion." Id. See also
EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976). In fact, one of the
most controversial areas in the search for equal employment opportunity continues to be the
use of judicially imposed employment quotas. See, e.g., Note, Constitutionalityof Remedial
Minority Preferences in Employment, 56 MImN. L. Rav. 842 (1972); Morrow v. Crisler, 491
F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 965 (1974).
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volve reverse discrimination to a small, ascertainable group of nonminority persons, namely to those specific white persons who were
not hired or promoted because points were added to the scores of
minority group persons. Other courts, to the extent that they wish
to lessen the effects of reverse discrimination, may follow the
Kirkland court. If they do, courts may be unwilling to sanction the
use of the Percentile Method.
The Context of the Reverse DiscriminationChallenge
To a great extent, the likelihood of success of a reverse discrimination challenge to the Percentile Method may depend upon the context in which the challenge is made. Since, as we have seen, courts
have permitted preferential treatment of persons of minority group
background and women pursuant to the dictates of a consent decree,"1 5 or pursuant to affirmative action obligations under Executive Order 11,246,116 to the extent that this method of selecting employees, or applicants for employment, is regarded as simply another preference to be afforded to persons of minority group background, its use in such contexts probably will be upheld. Similarly,
federal courts, upon finding unlawful discrimination, may very well
be authorized to order an employer to adopt the Percentile Method,
since eight circuits have authorized district courts to establish goals
for the purpose of remedying the effects of past discrimination.' In
so doing, courts have rejected the argument that section 703(j) of
Title VII"5 prohibits such action."'
What is less clear, however, is whether employers may voluntarily
115.
116.
117.
118.

See note 97 supra.
See note 98 supra.
See note 96 supra.
Section 703(j) of Title VII provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual
or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such
individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total number of percentage of persons of such race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other
area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
119. See, e.g., EEOC v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4539 (3d Cir. 1977);
United States v. Int'l Union of Elevator Constr., 538 F.2d 1012, 1019 (3d Cir. 1976); Rios v.
Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1974). But see the persuasive dissent
by Judge Hays, 501 F.2d at 634-39.
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decide to use the Percentile Method to alleviate what they regard
to be the effects of past discrimination or to achieve a racially integrated workforce. It can be argued that since courts have broad
discretion to order preferential treatment of persons of minority
group background once unlawful discrimination has been found,
and since employers may engage in affirmative action programs
pursuant to a consent decree, no legitimate purpose is served by
requiring an employer to go through the litigation process before the
employer is permitted to utilize methods such as the Percentile
Method. In short, in light of the fact that cooperation and voluntary
compliance is "the preferred means" of effectuating Title VII,120
employers should be encouraged to adopt the Percentile Method as
a voluntary corrective measure.
Some courts faced with similar arguments, although not involving the Percentile Method, have rejected the notion that employers
may voluntarily adopt programs which afford preferential treatment to persons of minority group backgrounds. In Brunetti v. City
of Berkeley,"' the Berkeley Fire Department administered a written
non-discriminatory, valid, job-related examination to candidates
seeking the promotional position of apparatus operator. From the
test results, an eligibility test was compiled, ranking the candidates
in numerical order to reflect their performance on the examination.
Ten of the eleven applicants on the list were white; the remaining
applicant was black. The black applicant was appointed to the
position of apparatus operator pursuant to the city's affirmative
action program' based solely upon his race. Plaintiffs, each of
whom were ranked above the black applicant, filed suit alleging
that the selection of the black applicant discriminated against the
white candidates on the basis of race in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In an opinion that (1)
completely ignored the different tests to be applied under the fourteenth amendment as opposed to Title VII, 2 (2) relied almost completely upon Title VII cases, and (3) failed to articulate which standard it was applying, the court said:
120. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
121. 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7363 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
122. The district court found that the City of Berkeley adopted the affirmative action
program in recognition of a "history of discriminatory employment practices throughout all
segments of American society," id. at 7365, but the program contained no legislative declaration of discriminatory conduct in the City of Berkeley itself. In fact the City during discovery
denied engaging at any time in discriminatory employment practices.
123. For a discussion of the various tests to be applied in the public employment context,
see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Comment, Washington v. Davis: Splitting the
Causes of Action Against Racial Discriminationin Employment, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 225 (1976).
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In the present case, the record is totally devoid of any legislative
declaration of past proven discriminatory practices by the City of
Berkeley. Defendants have consistently maintained that the Affirmative Action Program was not launched to rectify prior discrimination in the municipal work force; and plaintiffs argue that
the City of Berkeley has never been guilty of discriminatory practices. Thus, on the present record, this court must find that no
historical justification exists for Berkeley's Affirmative Action Program, and that the program may not be sustained as a remedial
measure. In absence of such a justification, the City of Berkeley
may not afford preferential treatment to minority employees in
violation of the rights of non-minority employees.' 4
Thereafter, in Weber v. KaiserAluminum and Chemical Corp.,'2 5
the issue of the voluntary adoption of preferential programs for minorities was raised in the context of a collective bargaining agreement which established a voluntary quota in craft training. Rejecting the idea that an employer may voluntarily adopt a quota system
preferring black employees who had never been subject to prior
discrimination by that employer, the court said:
At first blush, it might appear inconsistent that the Act on one
hand makes unlawful the establishment by employers of affirmative action programs, while on the other hand permits, if not requires, the courts to fashion similar relief in certain cases. Upon
reflection, however, substantial distinctions become apparent.
The most important and obvious distinction is the fact that
Sections 703(a) and (d) of Title VII do not prohibit the courts from
discriminating against individual employees by establishing quota
systems where appropriate. The proscriptions of the statute are
directed solely to employers.
There are other logical and compelling reasons for distinction
between employer action and court action. First, because relief of
this nature should be imposed with extreme caution and discretion, and only in those limited cases where necessary to cure the
ill effects of past discrimination, the courts alone are in a position
to afford due process to all concerned in determining the necessity
for and in fashioning such relief. Further, the administration of
such relief by the courts tends to assure that those remedial programs will be uniform in nature and will.exist only as long as
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Civil Rights Act.' 6
Of course, it can be argued in response that affirmative action
124. 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 7367.
125. 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976).
126. Id. at 767-68. See also Reeves v. Eaves, 415 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Hiatt v.
City of Berkeley, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 251 (Cal. 1976).
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programs drafted in accordance with Executive Order 11,246 have
been sanctioned by the courts,'2 although such programs do not
receive judicial supervision. However, these affirmative action programs are administered by various federal agencies and the courts
have carefully scrutinized them to be certain that they are good
faith attempts to comply with the affirmative action requirements
of Executive Order 11,246 and that any affirmative relief taken is
1 28
reasonably tailored to meet those requirements.
Unfortunately, the recent case of Germann v. Kipp 1 9 does much
to confuse the issue as to whether employers not subject to Executive Order 11,246 or to the dictates of a consent decree, may voluntarily adopt preferential programs for minorities such as the Percentile Method of selecting employees. In that case, the fire department of Kansas City, Missouri, in compliance with the city charter,
and duly-enacted ordinances adopted in accordance with Executive
Order 11,246 and Revised Order No. 4 of the Department of Labor, 13
promulgated an affirmative action program. Pursuant thereto, the
director of the fire department promoted five minority members to
select positions although these persons ranked lower on the relevant
certification lists than did other white candidates. Plaintiffs, persons who were passed over for promotion but who ranked higher on
the certification lists than did those minority members who were
promoted, brought suit alleging violation of the civil rights statutes
and the fourteenth amendment. In denying plaintiffs' motion for an
injunction on statutory as well as constitutional grounds, the court
said:
Plaintiffs cite an unreported decision, Brunetti v. City of Berkeley,
[citation omitted] as authority for the proposition that a voluntary affirmative action program which results in promotion of a
minority municipal fire department employee over a higherranked white candidate is invalid where there is no showing that
the city's job practices were discriminatory or that the program
was needed to correct past racial discrimination. With due respect
for the reasoning of the District Court for the Northern District
of California from the cases cited within its unreported decision,
this Court simply does not arrive at the same conclusion. The
requirement of a finding of past discrimination before a court, in
the exercise of its broad equitable power, may compel implementation of an affirmative action plan, including quota relief, does
not necessarily mandate the conclusion that an employer may not
voluntarily implement a reasonable, short-term affirmative action
127. See cases cited at note 98 supra.
128. See, e.g., Germann v. Kipp, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4525 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
129. Id.
130. See note 98 supra.
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plan to remedy the effects of historical discrimination. That conclusion, which in effect would require employers to admit past
discrimination or wait until they were sued by a minority individual and compelled to implement affirmative action, would fly in
the very face of the conciliatory efforts intended to be made under
Executive Order 11246, and would appear to this Court to contradict the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment and its mandate to
remove not only the incidence of discrimination but its effects as
well.'3
However, the underscored language is of less assistance than one
might think at first glance in resolving the issue of whether employers may voluntarily adopt preferential programs for minority group
members. Since Germann arose in the context of a public employer
having affirmative action obligations pursuant to an ordinance
drafted in accordance with Executive Order 11,246, the underscored
language is dicta. Moreover, it makes little sense to speak of an
employer voluntarily implementing an affirmative action program
if it has legal obligations under various executive orders.
Given the compelling arguments in Weber, and given the very
delicate balancing of competing interests which necessarily must be
considered,'32 it is reasonable to conclude that courts probably will
be hesitant to allow employers to adopt the Percentile Method on a
voluntary basis.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE PERCENTILE METHOD

Apart from concerns in general about preferential programs for
minority employees and applicants for employment, questions arise
about the wisdom of utilizing the Percentile Method. Thus, in order
to evaluate whether courts should order employers to test by the
Percentile Method, the method itself must be evaluated.
The most serious flaw with this method of selecting employees is
that no reason whatsoever is given for adding points to the scores of
minority group members on the Wonderlic Test, except that such
persons tend to do less well on that test than do whites that have
taken the test. However, this in itself does not justify use of the
Percentile Method. That is, in order to establish such a justification, it must be shown that although members of a minority group
do less well on the Wonderlic Test than do whites, they perform
equally well on the job.'3 This, however, cannot be done without a
131.
132.
133.

14 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 4531.
See text accompanying notes 111-115 supra.
This is the justification for the use of differential validation.
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validation study of a particular test for a particular job and, it will
be remembered, it was precisely the interest in avoiding the burdens
of validation that led to the recommended use of the Percentile
Method. Thus, without relying upon the historical justifications for
preferential programs, problems may exist with the Percentile
Method.
Moreover, it can be argued that other problems exist with this as
an employee selection device. If points are to be added to all "black
scores" on the Wonderlic Test, how are "black scores" to be
identified? If a person has a Negro father and a Caucasian mother,
does he qualify for the addition of points to his score? If a GermanAmerican woman marries a Chicano, does she qualify as a Spanish
surnamed individual for the purpose of deciding whether points are
to be added to her score? In short, before the Percentile Method can
work, the class of persons who will be afforded a preference must be
defined. 134 Furthermore, if the purpose of adding points is to remedy
the effects of past discrimination and cultural deprivation, so that
all people are on a relatively even footing when applying for a job,
then an attempt should be made to determine whether any particular person has suffered these particular deprivations before points
are added to his score. That is, it cannot properly be assumed across
the board that all blacks have been subjected to such deprivations
35
and all whites have not.
Several replies can be given to these arguments. Of course, employers could define by race or national origin those persons who are
to be afforded a preference, 136 or employers could implement such
methods as visual identification or a questionnaire which requests
information about what race or national origin each employee, or
applicant for employment, considers himself. The former suggestion
is repugnant and injects race too heavily into the employment process, while the latter suggestion is subject to error or deliberate
misrepresentation.
134. This question is more than academic. Litigation has arisen as to the criteria to be
applied in determining who is an Indian in the United States for the purpose of preferential
hiring practices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1976, § E, at 6,
col. 4.
135. This point has been made by others in the educational context. See, e.g., Weber,
Racial Bias and the LSAT: A New Approach to the Defense of PreferentialAdmissions, 24
BUFFALO L. REV. 439, 446-47 (1975); Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the
Equal ProtectionClause: An Analysis of the CompetingArguments, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 343,
395-96. (1974).
136. For example, employers desiring to give persons of minority background a preference
could model rules after the statute adopted by the state legislature of Virginia when it
outlawed interracial marriages. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 1-14 (Repl. Vol. 1960). This statute
was declared unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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With respect to the argument that the Percentile Method is overbroad because it fails to consider the individual case, Professor John
Kaplan has replied in another context:
Nor will it do to assert that this argument is fallacious in making
a blanket assumption about Negroes, which applies to some, but
not all. The ready reply is that our society often predicates special
treatment upon judgments as to the needs of some but not all the
members of a class, plus an unwillingness to draw distinctions
exempting the relatively few who are not in need. Thus laws requiring shorter hours for women than for men are not based on the
supposition that all women are frailer and less healthy than all
men. The convenience of single lines is important also, and it has
been therefore argued unless "looking at color" is used, "elaborate
machinery" will have to be set up in many cases to determine
37

"need and

. . .

social workism will be tremendously increased.'

In the end, whether such replies are sufficient to survive a reverse
3
discrimination challenge remains to be seen. 1
Moreover, as long as other alternatives remain open to employers,
such as giving preferences to all persons subjected to economic deprivation or discrimination, regardless of race or national origin,
courts may back away from the Percentile Method in favor of less
drastic means of achieving equal employment opportunity. Furthermore, other alternatives exist. Because of the consequences to white
victims of the Percentile Method, courts can refuse to allow employers to utilize this method and instead require validation of all job
tests which have an adverse impact upon minority group members
before points are added to their scores. Although this approach
would be more expensive to employers, it would neither have the
divisive effects that use of the Percentile Method would have nor
would it subject members of minority groups to unwarranted employment tests.
CONCLUSION

In their desire to select qualified employees for positions, employers frequently have resorted to the use of employment tests as a
selection device. In so doing, employers have during the past eleven
years been subjected to litigation instituted by minority group
members who have been adversely affected by such employment
137. Kaplan, supra note 103, at 365.
138. Certainly Kaplan's example is ill-chosen since female protective statutes have been
held to violate Title VII. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiee, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D.
Ill. 1970); Gaineau v. Raytheon Co., 323 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1971); Burns v. Rohr Corp.,
346 F. Supp. 994 (S. D. Cal. 1972).
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tests. Because of the difficulties employers have encountered in
complying with the EEOC guidelines, and because of the substantial expense involved in so doing, some have suggested that employers should merely add points to the scores of minority applicants for
employment for the purpose of eliminating the adverse impact of
particular employment tests and, thus, the need for test validation.
One such method which has been suggested is the Percentile Within
Normative Class Method of Selecting Employees.
Unquestionably such suggestions have benefits for employers desiring both to continue to use employment tests and to increase their
minority work force while avoiding the hazards of litigation. However, as has been shown, employers adopting such methods may be
confronted with law suits brought by whites challenging such methods as unlawful reverse discrimination.
Although problems may exist with the suggested methods, ultimately the success of litigation attacking them probably will depend upon the context in which such methods have been adopted.
As we have seen, if these methods are adopted by court order, either
upon a finding of discrimination or pursuant to a consent decree,
they probably will be upheld. Similarly, if employers adopt such
methods pursuant to an affirmative action program instituted
under Executive Order 11,246, they most likely will survive claims
of reverse discrimination. What is less certain, however, is whether
employers, recognizing the need to integrate their work force, will
be permitted voluntarily to give preference to minority employees
and applicants for employment. Some lower courts, based upon
compelling arguments, have prohibited such actions. In so doing,
they have recognized the importance of court supervision in the
delicate process of the granting of preference to minority employees
and applicants for employment.
Finally, assuming that federal courts have the authority to order
an employer to adopt methods such as the Percentile Method
whereby minority employees, or applicants for employment, are
given preferences on employment tests, the question still arises as
to whether courts should order that such methods be adopted. In
this regard, this article has suggested that certain problems exist
with such methods which should cause courts concern. As a result,
courts may find that the more expensive and time-consuming process of test validation is, in the end, still a preferable alternative to
affording minority preferences in the testing area.

